NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Authors

  • Sukhrob Hamidov,Jozef Batora International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan Islamic Economics and International Relations International Relations,Final year exchange student in Comenius University Author

Keywords:

Hedley Bull’s English School view helps clarify what is being challenged. International society exists when states recognize common rules and institutions, even without world government; diplomacy, law, war and balance of power remain organized mainly through states (Bull, 1977, pp. 13–15). Non-state actors therefore matter because they disturb the assumption that order is produced only by states.

Abstract

To be or not to be… This question is no longer only for individuals, in contemporary international relations, it is also a question for the state. The modern state claims to defend territory, control violence and represent political life. Yet recent crises show that actors without sovereignty can still force states and institutions to react. This paper asks whether non-state actors seriously challenge the centrality of the state. It argues that they do, but not by replacing states. Their challenge is practical recognition: they become actors that states, markets and international organizations cannot ignore. The Houthis disrupt maritime trade, SpaceX/Starlink supports Ukraine’s wartime communication, Wagner/Africa Corps blurs private violence and Russian strategy, and ISIS-K reorganizes counter-terrorism agendas. The result is not a post-state world, but a more hybrid order in which state centrality is no longer exclusive. This argument is important because debates about non-state actors often move between two extremes: either states are still the only real actors, or globalization has made them obsolete. The evidence below suggests a middle position.

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Published

2026-06-15