HSR (LONDON),
HOUGHTON STREET REVIEW JOURNAL
ISSN: 2058-5519|Impact factor-15.9
http://houghtonstreetreview.com/index.php/hsr

ECONOMIC MECHANISMS FOR ENSURING EMPLOYMENT STABILITY IN THE MODERN LABOUR MARKET

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doi:https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22809525

Abstract: Employment stability requires more than a low unemployment rate: it also depends on reliable earnings, productive job matches and protection during transitions. This article examines the economic mechanisms capable of supporting these outcomes in the modern labour market, with particular attention to Uzbekistan. A structured analytical review of fifteen academic and institutional sources is combined with descriptive analysis of national unemployment data for 2020-2025. The synthesis identifies five complementary mechanisms: productive investment, targeted employment incentives, skills development and matching, income protection and formalisation, and outcome-based governance. The reported unemployment decline provides a favourable macroeconomic context but does not establish individual job stability or policy causality. An integrated decision framework is proposed to distinguish temporary shocks from structural adjustment. The article concludes that policy effectiveness should be assessed through sustained formal employment, real earnings and social protection coverage rather than initial placement counts alone.

Keywords: employment stability; labour market; economic mechanisms; active labour market policy; formalisation; human capital; Uzbekistan.

Introduction

Technological change, shifting demand and new employment arrangements make the relationship between job creation and employment security increasingly important. The International Labour Organization reports that resilient headline labour market indicators coexist with persistent deficits in job quality (1). The World Bank similarly emphasises that technological transformation changes the skills demanded by employers and strengthens the case for investment in human capital and broader social protection (2). A policy focused exclusively on placing people into any available job therefore addresses only part of the problem.

Employment stability is defined here as the capacity to maintain adequate paid work over time, avoid involuntary interruptions and move between jobs without prolonged income or protection gaps. This definition distinguishes stability from permanent attachment to one employer. Voluntary movement to a better job can improve economic security even when conventional measures of firm-level employee retention decline.

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Search-and-matching theory explains why vacancies and unemployment can coexist when information and recruitment are costly (3). Human capital theory connects education and training with productive capabilities and earnings (4). These perspectives suggest that subsidies cannot sustainably compensate for poor matching or weak productivity. The OECD Jobs Strategy extends this logic by treating job quantity, job quality, inclusion and adaptability as interconnected policy objectives (5).

Uzbekistan's 2025 Country Economic Memorandum identifies private sector development and better market integration as foundations for growth and employment (6). This study examines how economic instruments can convert employment expansion into durable security under fiscal and administrative constraints. It links each mechanism to its transmission channel, implementation risks and measurable medium-term outcomes.

Materials and Methods

The study combines a structured, purposive literature review with descriptive statistical analysis. Fifteen sources were selected from academic publishers, the International Labour Organization, the OECD, the World Bank, Uzbekistan's statistical system and LexUZ. Selection prioritised relevance to employment continuity, identifiable publication details, methodological transparency and applicability to labour market policy. The corpus includes foundational theory, empirical evaluations, institutional reports, legislation and one official statistical series; it is not an exhaustive systematic review or a new meta-analysis.

The quantitative component uses six annual unemployment observations for 2020-2025 from SIAT indicator 2.02.01.2200, updated on 20 April 2026 and accessed on 17 September 2026. The source labels 2025 data as preliminary (7). The institutional review considers the Law on Employment of the Population and the Labour Code adopted in 2022 (8), (9). These documents establish policy context; their existence is not treated as evidence of effective implementation.

Sources were compared across five dimensions: the problem addressed, the economic transmission channel, the intended beneficiary, implementation risks and observable outcomes. Changes in unemployment were calculated in percentage points and relative to the initial year. No regression, survey or enterprise-level causal evaluation was conducted. Recommendations are analytical propositions derived from the synthesis, not estimates of programme effects.

Results

Improvement in unemployment and its interpretive limitsThe reported unemployment rate decreased from 10.5% in 2020 to 4.8% in 2025, a reduction of 5.7 percentage points, or approximately 54.3% relative to the starting rate. Intermediate observations were 9.6% in 2021, 8.9% in 2022, 6.8% in 2023 and 5.5% in 2024 (7). Figure 1 presents this descriptive trajectory.

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


Figure 1. Reported unemployment rate in Uzbekistan, 2020-2025.
Source: author's visualisation of SIAT data (7). *2025 is preliminary. Values are percentages of the economically active population.

The series alone cannot show whether newly employed people retained work, received predictable wages or obtained social insurance. Nor can it distinguish the contribution of specific programmes from recovery, demographic change or labour force movements. The central empirical implication is therefore a measurement requirement: aggregate unemployment should be complemented by longitudinal evidence on employment spells, earnings and formal coverage.Complementary mechanisms and policy trade-offs

The review identifies complementarity rather than a universally superior instrument. Card, Kluve and Weber find that average active labour market programme impacts are small in the short run but become more positive two to three years after completion, particularly for programmes emphasising human capital accumulation (10). OECD evidence on job retention schemes highlights a different purpose: preserving viable employment relationships during temporary shocks, while avoiding support that obstructs subsequent adjustment (11). Table 1 translates these distinctions into an implementation-oriented mechanism matrix.

Table 1. Economic mechanisms for employment stability and their implementation conditions.

Mechanism	Economic channel	Main risk	Safeguard / outcome
Productive investment and finance	Improves cash flow, capacity and demand for labour.	Credit supports weak firms or substitutes for private finance.	Viability review; productivity and paid-job continuity.

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Mechanism	Economic channel	Main risk	Safeguard / outcome
Targeted hiring and retention incentives	Lowers entry costs and protects viable matches during shocks.	Pays for jobs that would exist anyway; displaces unsubsidised workers.	Time limits, payroll checks and post-subsidy employment.
Skills development and job matching	Reduces skill gaps and search costs; improves job fit.	Training is unrelated to vacancies or placement quality.	Employer-validated skills; earnings and sustained placement.
Income protection and formalisation	Pools income risk and improves the value of formal participation.	Unaffordable contributions or abrupt benefit withdrawal.	Accessible enrolment; continuity of work and protection.
Outcome-based governance	Aligns funding with durable results and coordinated delivery.	Selective recruitment, nominal placements or unreliable reporting.	Independent follow-up; inclusion and cost per additional job.

Source: author's synthesis of (3)-(6) and (8)-(13). Instruments and evaluation conditions are proposed; no effect sizes are estimated.

Income protection and formalisation connect these mechanisms. The ILO identifies social protection as a means of strengthening households' capacity to manage shocks and adapt (12). Recommendation No. 204 calls for transitions to formality that preserve livelihoods and coordinate employment, enterprise and protection policies (13). Accordingly, formalisation should offer accessible benefits and workable contribution procedures, not registration requirements alone.

The synthesis also distinguishes technological productivity gains from automatic employment gains. Acemoglu and Restrepo document adverse local employment and wage effects of industrial robot exposure in the United States (14). This does not establish the same effects in Uzbekistan, but it supports evaluating technology adoption together with task redesign and retraining. Workers displaced from specific tasks need credible routes into new productive activities, even when the enterprise as a whole becomes more efficient.

Finance and labour incentives should consequently be assessed jointly. Credit support may not sustain employment without sufficient demand, while hiring incentives may fail when firms cannot finance working capital. The proposed framework links assistance to business viability, wage-payment capacity and employment after support expires, rather than treating promised headcount as verified performance.

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Discussion

Choosing between retention and transition support The policy objective should be to preserve economically viable employment relationships without preventing movement toward better opportunities. Figure 2 separates temporary demand shocks from persistent structural mismatch. Under the first condition, time-limited wage support or liquidity assistance may protect an otherwise productive match. Under the second, prolonged retention subsidies risk delaying adjustment; retraining, placement services and income protection are more appropriate candidate instruments. This distinction is consistent with the OECD's analysis of the changing role of retention support as crisis conditions recede (11).




Figure 2. Proposed decision pathway for employment stabilisation and adjustment.

Source: author's conceptual synthesis of (2), (10)-(13). Arrows indicate policy logic, not measured causal effects.

A package for Uzbekistan should combine productive enterprise conditions with worker-centred adjustment support. Reliable infrastructure, competitive market access and suitable finance can improve the basis for labour demand; these priorities align with the World Bank's country diagnosis (6). Employment services should then respond to verified vacancies and skill requirements, rather than train participants for occupations selected without employer input. Employer co-financing can test demand, although safeguards are needed to avoid excluding smaller firms or disadvantaged workers.

Informality requires a differentiated approach. The OECD and ILO show that informal workers face diverse household, income and occupational vulnerabilities, making a single compliance instrument inadequate (15). A proposed package would combine simplified registration, affordable contributions, accessible protection and proportionate enforcement. Contribution schedules should avoid sharp eligibility thresholds that make a small earnings increase financially unattractive. Benefits should remain understandable and accessible during movement between employers, self-employment and periods of job search.

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Sequencing matters. Administrative access, trustworthy records and delivery capacity should be established before expanding complex subsidies. Initial implementation can prioritise transparent pilots with explicit eligibility, budget ceilings and expiry rules. Wider coverage should depend on evidence of additional sustained employment, not simply rapid expenditure or high enrolment.

Enterprise application and evaluation

For enterprises involved in food storage and distribution, the framework suggests linking workforce plans to inventory cycles, service demand and technology investment. Cross-training between storage operations, quality control and dispatch could support internal redeployment when individual tasks change. Predictable wage payment, clear scheduling and consultation before reorganisation would make retention a matter of operational reliability as well as employee loyalty. This sectoral illustration is conceptual, not an evaluation of the author's enterprise.

Public programmes should follow participants beyond initial placement. A proposed primary indicator is the share of all programme entrants with verified formal paid employment in every month from month seven through month twelve after entry. Employment with different employers would count, thereby recognising successful mobility. Same-employer retention should be reported separately. Real earnings, involuntary gaps, hours and social protection coverage would reveal whether apparent stability conceals low pay or insufficient work.

Outcome-based payments require safeguards against selecting only easy-to-place applicants. Performance should be disaggregated by age, sex, disability status, region and prior unemployment duration, where lawful and statistically reliable. Follow-up should include all entrants, with missing outcomes disclosed rather than silently removed. Independent verification and accessible complaints procedures would reduce incentives to report nominal placements that do not result in paid work.

Fiscal evaluation should distinguish gross placements from additional sustained jobs. Cost per additional sustained job equals net programme expenditure divided by the estimated increase in sustained employment attributable to the intervention. Such additionality requires a credible comparison group; it cannot be inferred from national unemployment changes. Where feasible and ethical, oversubscribed pilots could use random assignment. Otherwise, transparent quasi-experimental evaluation should test selection differences and the assumptions underlying its counterfactual.

Limitations

The analysis uses a purposive evidence base and a short aggregate series. It cannot measure employment duration, identify a causal effect of Uzbekistan's reforms or determine an optimal subsidy rate. The preliminary status of the 2025 observation adds revision risk. Findings from other institutional settings require local validation. Future research should link anonymised programme, payroll and social insurance records, subject to privacy safeguards, to test which policy combinations improve sustained employment at an acceptable public cost.

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Conclusion

Employment stability is best understood as the joint outcome of productive jobs, effective matching, income security and protected mobility. Uzbekistan's reported unemployment decline is encouraging, but it does not by itself demonstrate durable, adequately paid employment. The analytical results favour a coordinated combination of productive investment, targeted incentives, skills development, formalisation and accountable programme management.

The practical priority is to distinguish temporary shocks from structural change, support viable matches without indefinitely preserving unproductive positions, and assess outcomes beyond initial placement. Evaluation should focus on sustained formal employment, real earnings, protection continuity and additionality. This approach makes employment policy a mechanism for long-term economic security rather than a competition to maximise short-term placement statistics.

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